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RIGHTS OF A BENEFICIARY IN A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY-A

question which is invariably asked of one seeking life insurance is
whether he wishes to reserve the right to change the beneficiary. So
much importance does the law attach to this reservation that different
rights are recognized in the named beneficiary according to whether
or not the right is reserved. In an old line life insurance policy in
which there is no reservation of this right, it is an almost universal
doctrine in this country that the beneficiary acquires a vested right.'
But where the policy reserves the right to change the beneficiary, the
person named as such, acquires no vested rights therein and the insured may make a substitution at will.2 The right of the named beneficiary in such a policy of insurance becomes vested at the death of
the insured, if no change of beneficiary has been made in fact or in
legal effect, and this vested right cannot be affected by any subsequent act of the insurer.3
An interest becomes vested when the beneficiary cannot be
deprived of the right to receive any sum payable according to the
terms of the policy, by any act of the insured done without the consent of the beneficiary except by a lapse of the policy.' When the
interest becomes vested, a few cases have held that the insurer is
deprived of a defense arising from the breach by the insured of a condition express or implied in the policy, on the ground that no act of
the insured could defeat the right of the beneficiary.5
This well recognized doctrine of vested interests is an extension
of the rights of a third party on a contract made for .his sole benefit.
'See CooLLY, Ba ns ON INSuRANCE (i905) 3755 and cases cited. i Wnuws§§ 396, 369 (1st ed. 192o).

TON, CONTRAcTs,

'Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816 (923);
Union Mutual Ass'n v. Montgomery, 70 Mich. 587, 38 N. W. 588 (i888).
'United Order of the Pilgrim Fathers v. Towne, 87 Conn. 644, 89 At. 264
(194) ; Davis v. Supreme Council, 195 Mass. 402, 81 N. E. 294, (19o7) ; Chambers v. Supreme Tent of the Knights of Maccabees, 20 Pa. 244, 49 Adt. 784
(igoi) ; Noble v. Police Beneficiary Ass'n, 224 Pa. 298, 73 AUt. 336 (igo9).
In Wisconsin, even without any reservation of the right to change the beneficiary, an insured person who pays the premiums may at any time dispose of
the policy or will it away without the consent of the beneficiary. Tweeddale v.
Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 44o (19o3). This local rule has, however,
been changed by statute in the case of insurance effected by a husband for the
benefit of his wife. Wis. Laws, i8g ch. 376 which adopts the general American
rule. See Boehmer v. Kalk, 155 Wis. i56, i44 N. W. 182 (1913).
' Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 2o6 (1888) ; Jones v.
Jones, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 254 (900).
'Seiler v. The Economy Life Ass'n, 1o5 Iowa 87, 74 N. W. 94 (898);
Tarrow v. Family Fund Society, 116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1093 (i889) ; Patterson v. The Natural Premium Mutual Life Ins. Co., oo Wis. 118, 75 N. W. 980
(1898).
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It is not only peculiar to the United States 6 but it is peculiar to the
contract of insurance. Ordinarily, the rights of a beneficiary are destroyed by the mutual agreement and rescission of the principals to
the contract before it is brought to his knowledge or before he has
assented to and acted on it. But in the contract of life insurance,
where no right to change the beneficiary is reserved, the principals
can not destroy the beneficiary's vested interest by mutual agreement
after the policy has been issued regardless of whether the named bene7
ficiary knows of or has assented to the policy.
The doctrine of vested interests had its origin in the United
States in statutes intended primarily to safeguard the interests of
married women and children in the proceeds of insurance policies
8
carried for their benefit by their protector. Great impetus was given
the doctrine in the first edition of Bliss, Life Insurance,' in which he
states: "We apprehend the general rule to be that a policy, and the
money to become due under it, belong the moment it is issued to the
person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and
that there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any
act of his, or hers, by deed or by will to transfer to any other person,
the interest of the person named: The person designated in the
policy is the proper person to receipt for and to sue for the money.
The legal representatives of the insured have no claim upon the money
and cannot maintain an action therefor if it is expressed to be for the
benefit of some one else." This statement was followed and quoted
in many decisions.'
This doctrine has been expanded to cover all cases of insurance
for the benefit of a third party, and hence there is conflict in the decisions as to the extent to which this interest of the beneficiary is
vested."
However, on principles not very easy to formulate, the certificate
of fraternal associations have been distinguished in this matter from
insurance policies. A beneficiary named in a certificate issued by a
beneficial association acquires no vested interest in it, nor a right to
anything during the lifetime of the member to whom it is issued, but
"In re Fleetwood's Policy, [1925] i Ch. 48. In England apart from statute
the beneficiary acquires no rights prior to the death of the insured. See Married
NVoman's Property Act, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 sec. i I.
T
Commercial Nat. Bank v. Kirkwood, 172 Ill. 563, 5o .N. E. 219 (1898);
Gifford v. Corrigan, 17 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756 (i889) ; PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d
ed. i92o) § 2394; POLLOCK, CONTRACTS, (Wald and Williston, 3d Am. ed. i9o6)
251.

N. Y. Laws, I84O, c. 8o; Mass. Laws, x844, c. 82.
'BLIss, LIFE INSURANCE (ist ed. 1872) § 317.
'l Supra, note i. Richer v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 193, 6 N.
W. 777 (i88o), in which, on the authority of Bliss' statement, the court reaches
this conclusion without the aid of other authorities.
'Supra, notes 6, 7. See W. R. Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life
Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L. J. 343 (1922).
a
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merely an expectancy which does not become a vested or absolute right
to the proceeds of the certificate until the death of the insured. 2
Perhaps the reason for this distinction is due to the almost universal reservation in the certificate of a right to change the beneficiary. 8
Concerning ordinary life insurance policies, the authorities do not
agree on the question of the extent of the beneficiary's interest in
policies where no right to change the beneficiary is reserved. In
the recent case of Schuberth v. Prudential Insurance Co., 4 the court
recognizes that the beneficiary has a vested interest in the policy,
unless the power to change the beneficiary is reserved, but refuses to
admit that the interest residing in the beneficiary is so absolutely
vested that it cannot be divested. While recognizing that a vested interest exists, this interest is subject to the provisions of the contract,
or as expressed by the United States Supreme Court, "the policy is
the measure of the rights of everybody under it." "I
If the ownership of the policy is in the beneficiary from the
moment it is issued, according to the doctrine stated by Bliss, it should
logically follow that the only legal interest that remains with the insured is the privilege of paying the premiums. But this conclusion
is in conflict with the cases that hold that the insured has the substantial right that the policy shall not be repudiated," and he may
receive damages for any breach of its conditions.'
A conflict has also arisen in cases where the beneficiary predeceases the insured. The prevailing rule gives the proceeds to the
personal representatives of the beneficiary,' but many courts refuse to
come to this conclusion and hold that upon the death of the beneficiary the vested rights revert to the insured as a lapsed trust. 9 In
the Schuberth case,20 although the point is not before the court for
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, 247 U. S. 394 (igi8) ;
Noble v. Police Beneficiary Ass'n, 224 Pa. 298, 73 Atl. 336 (i909).
Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N. W. 8oo (i9oo);
Sabin v. Phinney, 134 N. Y. 423 (1892).
1486 Pa. Super. 8o (1926). Cf. Entwistle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2o Pa. 41,
51 Atl. 759 (i902). The policy contained the clause, "This policy may be converted into cash at the option of the holder, etc." The court held that the beneficiaries were included in the term "holder" and hence no exercise of the option
could be made without the consent of the beneficiary. This seems like a strained
construction of the policy, but presents a ground on which the cases may be reconciled.
"Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 234 (911);
Morgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 2o9 Ala. 110, 95 So. 355 (1923).
'Day v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480 (1878) ; cf., Kelley v.
Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., i86 N. Y. i6, 78 N E. 584 (I9o6).
'Lovell v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., III U. S. 264 (1884).
' Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 6o (1875) ; Harley v. Heist,
86 Ind. 196 (1882); Hooker v. Sugg, ioz N. C. 115, 8 S. E. gig (i889).
'Ryan v. Rothweiler, 50 Ohio St. 595, 35 N..E. 679 (1893); Smith v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 222 Pa. 226, 71 Atl. ii (i9o8).
I Supra, note 17.
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decision, it is stated in the opinion that if the beneficiary had died
before her husband, her interest would have died with her.
These conflicts indicate a dissatisfaction with the general rule,
due perhaps to the fact that there is no logical reason to treat the beneficiary's right as entirely vested. The doctrine can not be supported
on the trust theory since there is no proof that any fund has been
specifically set aside by the company as the res of the trust. Nor
can the transaction be considered as the gift of a chose in action,
upon issuance of
since the right of the beneficiary arises immediately
21
the policy, without delivery to-the beneficiary.
It is submitted that the doctrine of vested interests in the beneficiary, when expanded to cover all cases of insurance for the benefit
of a third party, is destructive of the actual intent of the insured.
The decision of the court in the principal case, making the policy the
measure of the rights of everybody under it, is a step towards slow
judicial retreat that should bring about a more reasonable doctrine.
The ultimate view in mind should be that no right vests in the beneficiary until the policy has matured, except as provided otherwise,
by statute, in the case of married women and children.
A.D.M.
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COMMON STOCK AS TAXABLE INCOME IN ENGLAND AND UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-That dividends declared in the form

of "paid-up" voting shares of common stock are not taxable as income under the United States Constitution has been well settled since
Eisner v. Macomber.' The words quoted by Mr. Justice Holmes in
the earlier case of Towne v. Eisner,? which was held to control the
decision in Eisner v. Macomber," best express the Supreme Court's
view of the law: "A stock dividend really takes nothing from the
property of the corporation and adds nothing to the interest of the
shareholders. ., . The proportional interest of each stockholder
remains the same. The only change is in the evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the original shares together representing the same proportional interest that the original shares repreSCf. Supreme Conclave v. Cappella, 41 Fed. i (C. C. Mich. i89o); when
however, the policy has been delivered to the beneficiary his right is clearly irrevocable in the absence of any reservation of a right to change the beneficiary.
Lemon v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Conn. 294 (1871) ; Hall v. Allen, 75
Miss. 175, 22 So. 4 (1897).
'252 U. S. 189 (192o).
2245 U. S.418 (1918).

The case held, specifically, that the Act of 1913
taxing incomes was not applicable to common stock dividends.
'Supra, note x. The case held that the Act of 1916, which specifically stated
that stock dividends were taxable as income, was unconstitutional.
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sented before the issue of the new ones." 4 In Eisner v. Macomber the
court re-examined the whole question. A point largely relied upon in
the majority opinion to demonstrate beyond doubt that such dividends
are capital and not income is that they bring to the shareholder no immediate realization of money or money's worth wuithout corresponding
loss it his proportionateinterest in and control of the company;--"it
being in the nature of things impossible for one to dispose of any part
of such an issue without . . . diminution of the seller's comparative voting power. Yest without selling, the shareholder, unless possessed of other resources, has not the wherewithal to pay an income
tax upon the dividend stock. Nothing could more dearly show that
to tax a stock dividend is to tax a capital increase, and not income,
than this demonstration that in the nature of things it requires conIt will be noted that the Supreme
version of capital to pay the tax."
Court, in passing on whether these dividends are principal or income
under the Sixteenth Amendment allowing taxation on "incomes, from
whatever source derived," looks at the question chiefly from the viewpoint of the individual whose income is in question, not from the viewpoint of the corporation which is making the distribution. - The question is not Does the company give anything? but Does the shareholder
get anything? This method of approach will hereinafter be referred
to as the "American" view.
A different angle of approach was adopted by the English courts;
but the same conclusion was reached. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Blott 6 decided, in substance, that bonus shares of common
stock are not taxable under an act taxing"total income from all sources
for the previous year." 7 But the English courts, in determining
whether the shareholder shall be taxed, are not chiefly concerned with
the practical question of whether he has received anything, but are
guided by the inherent significance of the acts of the company. The
question they seek to answer is: Has the company paid out to its
shareholder something to which it has imparted the character of income?
In his judgment delivered in the House u. Lords in Inland Revenue Commissionersv. Fisher'sExecutors,s which was held to be controlled by Blott's case,9 Lord Sumner understands that the latter case
was "decided on this principle. To attract super tax to a bonus distributed to him by a company in which he is a shareholder, what
reaches the taxpayer must at that moment bear the character of in"Supra, note 2,at 426, quoting Gray, J., in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549,
559, 56o (i89o). For full discussion of the development of the theory of stock
dividends, see references cited in 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. 84, n. 5 (1924).
'Supra, note i, at 212-213 (majority opinion by Pitney, $.).
A. C. 171.
7Finance Act (igo) io Edw. VII,
" [1921] 2

c. 8, § 66
A. C. 395 (Part III, June 2).
Supra, note 6.

8 [1926]
9

(2).
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come, impressed upon it Ly the company which distributes it and by
it alone. Provided that the company violates no statute and also keeps
within its articles, it can call the subject-matter of the distribution
what it likes. . . . After all, it is natural for the creature to be
named by its creator. Further, what the company says it is, that it is
as against all the world. What the company says it shall no longer be,
that it is no longer for any purpose. . . . In what the company
has said and done is found the answer to the question: What has the
subject-matter of the distribution now become or ceased to be, when
first it reaches the taxpayer ?" 10 Lord Sumner also denies any importance to the circumstance that the shareholder has received something of immediate value: "The fact is that money's worth is not a
material circumstance, until the bonus distributed has been shown,
when still in the company's hands and at the time of distribution, to
be impressed with the character of income of the company." " His
theory does not rest, as does that of the United States Supreme Court,
on the proposition that the shareholder gets no realizable money's
worth without a corresponding loss in proportionate company control.
The facts of the Fisher case, however, differ somewhat from
those of Blott's case. The details of the transaction by which, in
1914, the Wearmouth Coal Company dealt with its reserve fund and
profits need not be described. Suffice it to say that the company determined not to distribute the sum in question, amounting to 1357,ooo,
in the form of a cash bonus to the stockholders, but to "effect the capitalization" 12 of these funds to improve the business. In lieu of the
cash bonus, the company issued to each stockholder, in proportion to
his holding, shares of 5 per cent. "debenture stock," repayable if and
when the company made certain defaults or was wound up, and redeemable from time to time within the company's discretion after
January I, 1920. This stock, which is the usual form of English
"debenture stock," is technically a debt. It is made a primary charge
on the corporate property, and as such will have priority over judgments obtained by general creditors and over claims of holders of common or preferred stock. It is thus, in effect as well as technically, a
specially secured debt. So much is undisputed. The question was
'%Supra, note 8, at 407-408. When the Fisher case was in the Court of
Appeal, Warrington, L. J., enunciated the same general test: "It is well settled
that the acton of a company in such matters not only binds the shareholders
as between them and the company, but determines as between them and the
Revenue whether the result of the transaction is the receipt by the shareholders
of taxable :ncome as distinguished from something which is not so taxable."
[i925] i K. B. 451, 464. In the same case, in the House of Lords, the present
Lord Chancellor (Viscount Cave) quotes with approval the statement that the
"true test as to whether a distribution of shares falls to be taxed depends upon
two questiors: (i) whether there has been a release of assets; (2) ifso, whether
the assets were capital or income." Supra, note 8, at 402-4o3, quoting Sankey, J.,
in Pool v. Guardian Investment Trust Co., [1922] I K. B. 347, 357.
'Supra, note 8, at 412.
"Supra, note 8, at 398.

NOTES

whether Bishop Fisher's apportionment of this debenture stock to the
amount of 182,500 was subject to the super tax on "total income from
all sources" 13in the year of assessment.
It will be seen at a glance that the test adopted by the English
judges is as applicable to this state of facts as to the facts in Blott's
case, where the dividend was in the form of voting shares of common
stock. The company has not issued to the shareholder ,its own income
properly labelled as such. Instead, it has retained the money to improve its own productiveness. It has, in effect "capitalized" it. All
the judges of the Court of Appeal, with one exception, and all the
judges in the House of Lords regarded these considerations as settling the particular question of whether the shareholder has received
taxable income and consequently held that the difference in fact from
the Blott case gave rise to no distinction in law. 4

The single exception is Lord Justice Scrutton, who professedly
approaches the question from what we have called the American viewpoint. After finding, substantially, that the shareholder has received
a marketable acknowledgment of debt, he decides, nevertheless, that
he has received no taxable income. Since the debt is realizable in
money without loss of proportionate company control, it is reasonable
to suppose that the United States Supreme Court would have reached
the opposite result. The apparent discrepancy between the premise
and the conclusion of the learned English justice is explained by the
fact that he unconsciously changes his point of view and in reality
decides the case on the ground that the company has marked the surplus represented by these shares "capital" instead of "income." '5
"Supra, note 7. The super tax in question is exclusively a tax on incomes
of a certain magnitude. In the language of the act, this tax shall be "estimated

in the same manner as the total income from all sources is estimated for the
purposes of exemptions or abatements under the Income Tax Acts." In his
judgement of the Fisher case in the Court of Appeal, Pollock, M. R., said:
we have to look at it from the point of view of super tax law, and to
see whether or not this portion of the debentur- stock received by the late
Bishop Fisher is a part of his total incc~ae estimaLed in the same manner as it
[1925] i I(.B. 451, 462.
would be estimated for income tax purposes."
"Fisher's case first arose before the Commissioners for Special Purposes of
the Income Tax Act, who decided that the dividend was not taxable as income.
Their judgment was reversed by Rowlatt, J., Ji925[ i K. B. 451, but was
unanimously restored by the Court of Appeal (ibid. at 457), and affirmed by the
House of Lords (supra,note 8).
'He says: "I propose to decide this case on the lines that nothing has been
received by Bishop Fisher in the year of assessment." [1925] 1 K. B. 451, 473.
In onswer to his own question "what . . . did Bishop Fisher receive?" he
says, in part: . He received an acknowledgment or recognition by the company
that if it had at the time property it would pay him something so many years.
hence, and would secure that payment by a charge on its assets, whatever it happened to have, and it might at the time when the sum became payable have none,
and would pay interest until the time when the debt became payable." Ibid. at
471. After thus showing that the shareholder has received a marketable security,
he unconsciously reverts to the viewpoint of the company and is consequently
enabled to concur in the decision of his two associates who had professedly looked
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Is there anything in the English test that should commend it to
the United States Supreme Court as superior to the test laid down in
Eisner v. Macomber? The passages quoted above from the judgments
of Lord Cave, Lord Sumner, and Lord Justice Warrington, in the
Fisher case, reveal dearly that the English court will not allow that
which is the capital of a corporation to be taxed as the intome of the
shareholders in that corporation. The unwillingness to regard the
corporation as a legal entity quite distinct from the legal entities
which compose it is a manifestation of the aggregate theory of corporations, which is of comparatively recent development. This theory
may be characterized as representing an attempt to get at the substantial truth of the corporate situation apart from the strict legal
logic on which the idea of corporations was founded. But there is
much to be said for the "entity theory," not only from the viewpoint
of legal logic, but also as giving a true idea of the situation as it exists. Apart from the generalities, however, it is unquestionably a
fact that the corporation and its individual shareholder are each subject to taxes of various sorts. Why, then, should the taxes of one be
dependent on the acts of the other? If the reasoning of Eisner v.
Macomber, which is in keeping with the entity theory, is followed, the
United States courts would find no difficulty in determining the income of the shareholder without reference to that of the corporation. 6
Only under the aggregate theory, which the English courts seem to
have adopted for the special purposes of this type of case,' 7 is there
anything incompatible in calling certain funds the capital of a corporation and calling certain marketable, secured certificates of debt representing those same funds the income of the shareholders of that corporation.
Moreover, the English view will doubtless lead to embarrassing
analogies. Suppose the Wearmouth Coal Company had issued to its
shareholders, in 1914, instead of debenture shares, negotiable promisat the question from that angle.--"If Bishop Fisher had sold the debentures,
the company would . . . have parted with none of their assets.

They would

owe a debt in futuro to somebody, Bishop Fisher or somebody else. .
Ibid. at 472.
"' This supposition is further supported by the fact that in the United States
this type of question will arise under the Constitution, instead of under an act,
as in England. The broad intentions of the sovereign people in voting for the
Sixteenth Amendment, rather than the applicability of any strictly legal
theory, such as the entity theory, will be the chief consideration. See the
dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J., in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, note i,
and references there cited. Also cf. the opinion of Holmes, J., in Towne v.
Eisner, supra, note 2, with his dissenting opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, supra,
note i. The scope of this comment, however, is restricted to the general merits
of the question without respect to difference between constitutional and legal
attitude.
' In general the English courts are distinctly less inclined than the American
to allow the aggregate theory to encroach upon the older entity theory. The English war cases disallowing certain claims of corporations formed under the
laws of England but of which all the stock was owned in Germany are regarded
as emergency decisions not likely to have weight as precedents.
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sory notes binding its general credit, redeemable in 999 years, or upon
the winding up, or upon certain contingencies, and payable after 1920
at the option of the company, with interest at 5 per cent. Can it be
doubted that such securities, which would have an immediate market
value, would be taxable, even in England, as income in the hands of
the shareholder? Yet this hypothetical case is substantially weaker
than the debenture case, because the notes bind only the general credit,
whereas the debenture shares are secured by a prior charge on the cor-L
porate property. In both cases the company has "capitalized" the
fund in question. In name, in theory, and in .substance, both are
debts: but the debentures are a secured debt. Can we base discrimination on the ground that one obligation is called stock and is coeval
with the company, barring default, while the other must definitely
mature in 999 years, even if the company is still in existence? Where
then will the English courts draw the line? It is submitted that the
American test, as laid down in Eisner v. Macomber, presents fewer
difficulties: If what the shareholder receives is immediately convertible into cash without loss of his share of company control, it is taxable
as income.'8
Clearly all certificates evidencing debts of the company are taxable under this test. These include checks, call notes, time notes or
bonds, whether specially secured or not, and debenture "stocks" of
the type issued in the Fisher case. Shares of common stock are not
taxable, since they involve a vote in company control., It is submitted that the same principle should be adopted in differentiating between the various kinds of preferred shares, of which there are at
least sixteen.20 When a dividend is declared in preferred stock which.
does not carry voting power, the substance of the transaction is that
the company has created a marketable debt.2 If the shares do carry
voting power, the case is analogous to the common stock dividend
cases.
But perhaps the most usual single type of preferred stock is
that which carries no voting power until a prcferred uividend has been
"passed" by the company and which then does carry voting power
The assessment of the tax on shares such as those in the Fisher case, is a
purely practical task for financial experts. On this subject, Rowlatt, J., whose
judgment of the Fisher case in the King's Bench was reversed, says: "This stock
may bear interest which will make it worth more than its face value. On the
other hand it may be worth less. The face value is not necessarily the measure of
the tax which the respondents must pay, and the case will therefore go back to
the Commissioners for the amount to be assessed." [1925] 1 K. B. 451, 457.
"Supra, note I, at 212-213.
This submission is in keeping with the better view that only holders of
voting shares have the pre-emptive right to subscribe to new issues of voting
shares.
The principal of this debt may be a definite amount or a definite proportion of the company's assets on winding up. In stock dividend cases, the Supreme

Court has ever professed to look at the substance and not the form of the transaction.
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until all overdue dividends have been paid. For purposes of taxation, is the holder of such certificates substantially a creditor of or a
shareholder in the company? Or is he first one thing and then the
other, depending on the state of the company's affairs? If and when
the company is in arrears in dividend payments he is indisputably a
shareholder. It may therefore be said with justice that he has a voice
in the management of the company unless it is functioning properly
under its ordinary governing body. After all, the executive branch
of company government is confided to directors; and the difference
in position between holders of common stock and of preferred stock
of the type in question is little more than a difference in degree. Both
are part of the machinery of government. In the absence of any
authorities, one is therefore inclined to suppose a dividend declared in
such shares ,to be not taxable as income.
That any answer to the broad question of what is capital and
what income is necessarily somewhat arbitrary will have been made
clear by the foregoing review of the leading English and American
authorities and of situations not yet brought to the cognizance of
either. It follows that no test will provide a perfect solution of all
the questions which may arise. What ve have called the American
test, as laid down in Eisner v. Macomber, seems to commend itself
as furnishing the soundest practical basis for the decision of these
difficult problems.
W.P.S.

LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURER

TO RETAILER FOR VIOLATION OF

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES LAw-The question of the liability of a
manufacturer to third parties for alleged breach of duty or representation has often been presented to our court. The recent New York
case of Abounader v. Strohmeyer and Arpe Co.' again raises this
problem. In that case the defendant manufactured a salad oil which
it sold in tin containers as an article of food. The containers were
labeled "net contents 4 gallon," but in fact contained a lesser quantity. This oil was sold by the defendant to a wholesaler who in turn
sold a quantity of it to the plaintiff, a retailer, for resale. Later the
latter was notified that he had incurred a penalty for violation of that
2
section of the Weights and Measures Act, which provided that no
person, with knowledge that same is false, shall use false weights or
measures, etc., and a delivery of a lesser quantity than represented is
presumptive evidence of knowledge by such person that he delivered
1217 App. Div. 43, 215 N. Y. Supp. 702 (1926).

'The Farm and Market Laws of I917 as amended by New York Laws of
1922, C. 360.

NOTES

short weight "3 While he succeeded in reaching a settlement upon
proof of his ignorance of the fact that the containers were short
weight the proceedings involved considerable expense. The retailer now sues the manufacturer. There was a judgment for the
plaintiff. The court, in its decision, intimated that the manufacturer may be liable to the retailer on a warranty of quantity, despite the lack of privity of contract; and held that the statute impliedly gives a civil remedy against the manufacturer, to anyone
damaged by a violation of it.
Viewing the case from the standpoint of warranty, the decision
is difficult to sustain. The court speaks of an implied warranty of
quantity, but it cites no decision and none has been located which

holds that the law implies a warranty of quantity in such an instance.
Since the label expressly set forth the purported net contents, it would
appear that if any warranty were present it would be an express
warranty.
Conceding that the label does constitute a warranty, the general
and well-accepted rule is that the mere resale of a warranted aifticle
does not give the subsequent purchaser a right to sue the original seller
for damages caused by a breach of the warranty.4 To this rule, but
one exception has gained any recognition: in the case of sale of
food products, a number of jurisdictions hold that the manufacturer
or producer may be liable to third parties on an implied warranty of
wholesomeness of the food for human consumption. 5 A study of
these cases will show that the basis for the exception is found in the
desire to preserve human health and that the exception applies only to
cases involving a warranty of quality.6
Some states do not recognize even this exception and hold that
the subsequent purchaser cannot recover from the manufacturer
directly on a warranty of quality in the absence of an express assign-

'This being a presumption of fact the satisfactory proof by the retailer'
that he had no knowledge of the short weight, and the fact that it was almost
impossible for him to determine the net weight of canned goods, justified the
dropping of the suit against him. The principal case, coming up as it did on a
motion to dismiss the complaint, did not show whether the manufacturer in this
case could successfully rebut the presumption of knowledge of short weight.
"Roberts v. Anheuser Busch Assn, 211 'Mass. 449, 98 N. E. 95- (19m);
Pearse and Dwyer Co. v. Somers Co., 130 Miss. 147, 93 So. 673 (1922) ; Chysky
v. Drake Bros., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923); Avery v. Barker, 243

S. W. 695 (Tex., 1922) ; Peregrine v. W. Seattle State Bank, i2o Wash. 653,
208 Pac. 35 (1922). See WnjsToN, SA1ms, (2d ed., 1924), § 244; 17 A. L. R.
672.
- Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, I76 N. W. 382 (1920);
Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 2oo N. W. 155 (1924); Tomlinson v.
Armour Co., 75 N. 3. L. 748, 7o Ad. 314 (i9o8) ; Catani v. Swift & Co., 251
Pa. 52, 95 AUt. 931 (I915); Mazette v. Armour Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac.
633 (1913).
'See cases cited supra, note 5. Also Peregrine v. W. Seattle State Bank,
supra, note 4.
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ment to the subsequent purchaser of all rights.7 In these jurisdictions, if there has been no such assignment, the subsequent purchaser's
recourse against the manufacturer must be founded upon a tort and
not upon a contract right.
The facts of the principal case establish, if any, a warranty of
quantity alone, and since it does not fall within the exception to the
general rule applicable to warranties, it would seem to follow that the
lack of privity of contract would prevent a recovery upon any theory
of warranty, and that the decision cannot be sustained upon that
ground.
Does then the violation of the statute raise a liability against the
manufacturer? It is an old and often repeated rule that "in every
case where a statute enacts or irohibits a thing for the benefit of a
person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing
enacted for his advantage or for the recompense of a wrong done to
him contrary to the said law." s This is true notwithstanding that the
statute does not in exact words give such a right of action.' Nor is
the right of an individual to recover for damages sustained as a proximate result of a breach of duty imposed by statute affected by the fact
that the statute imposed a penalty for its violation, provided such
penalty was not made the exclusive remedy.' 0
The above rule has found numerous applications. In one case a
tenant was permitted to recover from a property owner who had not
complied with a statute requiring the erection of fire escapes. It was
clear that the injured party was one of the class intended to be benefited by the statute."
The rule has been evoked against an employer
who had violated the Child Labor Act, and a minor was allowed to
recover damages for injuries despite evidence of contributory negligence.' 2 So also the rule has been enforced in instances of breaches
of statutes on employer's liability,' sale of firearms to minors, 14 viola'Birmingham Co. v.Clark, 2o5 Ala. 678, 89 So. 64 (1921); Pelletier v.
Du Pont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 187 (1925); Chysky v. Drake Bros., mpra,
note 4.
'Anon. 6 Mod. 26. (Eng., 1704).
'Parker v. Bernard, 135 Mass. 116 (1883) ; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153
Mich. 438, i6 N. W. 11o7 (igo8); Lichtman v.Rose, io N. Y. Supp. 935
(App. Div., i9o8); Drake v.Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 At!. 14 (1912).
°Strafford v.Republic Iron Co., 238 Ill.
371, 87 N. E. 358 (19o9) ; Barfott
v. White Star Line, 170 Mich. 349, 136 N. W. 437 (1912); Anderson v. Settergren, IoO Minn. 294, III N. W. 279 (19o7); Stehle v.Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 22o Pa. 6,7, 69 Atl. xix6 (igo8).
'Di Santo v. Brooklyn Chair Co., 14o App. Div. 119, 125 N. Y. Supp. 8
(Igio).
"Strafford v.Republic Iron Co., supra, note io; Karples v. Heine, 227
N. Y.74, x24 N. E. OI (1919); McGowan v.Ivanhoe Mfg.Co., 167 N. C.192,
82 S.E. 1O28 (1914) ; Stehle v.Jaeger Automatic Co., supra, note io.
"Texas & Pacific Ry. v.Rigsby, 241 U. S.33 (9,5).
"Pizzo v.Weiman, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N. W. 899 (1912); Anderson v.
Sellergrin, supra, note io; Shaffer v.Mowery, 265 Pa. 300, io8 Atl. 654 (igig).

NOTES
15

tion of navigation laws, and of statutes regulating use of motor
vehicles.'
In the case of Meshbesher v. Channelline Oil Co.,17 we
find a case very similar to the principal case and there als6 the decision
was founded upon the old rule. There a manufacturer sold impure
sweet oil to a retailer who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. The latter
was made ill. In a suit by the consumer, the manufacturer was held
liable, because the plaintiff came within the class intended to be benefited by the statute regulating sale of foodstuffs.
A consideration of these statutes and cases shows a well-recognized trend of authorities which have reiterated the above rule. And,
while the courts may not intimate that there is a substantial difference
in these statutes, it is interesting to note the results which accrue. In
the case of statutes regulating the quality of foods, the statute law, in
effect, has given an opportunity for an application of the rule for
statutory breach, when, if it were not for the statute, the party injured
could recover in a common law action for negligence, or breach of
implied warranty. Thus the statute merely enables a recovery upon a
new theory, the duty remaining the same. Then there is the statute
which is premised on an already existing duty, but which proceeds to
extend that duty. The Child Labor Laws are of this group, and the
courts, by applying the rule for statutory breach, have held the
employer absolutely liable for injuries to a minor sustained during
employment which was in violation of the law. In such a case a duty
of care already exists, but the statute as applied by the civil courts has
so completely changed the nature of that duty that its effect is to
create a new obligation.
The application of the rule to the principal case is but a step
beyond this last illustration. While it differs somewhat, it is a dif-ference of degree and not of kind. Before the statute, the retailer's
remedy was against the party from whom he purchased, the action
being based on a warranty or upon fraud and deceit. Then the legislature undertook to protect certain classes of people by making it
illegal to knowingly use false weights and measures. Then the civil
courts, applying the rule for breach of statute, permit those intended
to be benefited to recover.. This application may' be regarded as
merely taking an old obligation already owed to one class, namely, the
party in privity to the manufacturer, and extending it to cover other
groups; or it may be regarded as creating an absolutely new duty.
Which ever way it is interpreted, its counterpart can be found in
numerous of the regulatory statutes.
Since the rule contended for may properly be applied to this type
of statute the case resolves itself into this issue: Does the plaintiff
qualify as one of the persons intended to be benefited by the statute?
'The Anna M. Fohy, 153 Fed. 866 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o7).
"Lohbach v. Colley, 283 Pa. 366, x29 At. 88 (1925); Fox v. Barekman,
178 Ind. 572,. 99 N. E. 989 (1912); Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155, 95
N. E. 4o4 (1911).
1 io7 Minn.

o4, Ii9 N. W. 428 (i9o9).
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This is essential if his recovery is to be founded upon the rule in
question.
To determine this problem the statute itself is quite suggestive.
It states that "the production, manufacturing, marketing, storing and
distribution of food, etc., are matters of public interest and proper
subjects for investigation and regulation by the state, to secure,"
among other things, "the exchange of such food upon a fair basis and
to prevent frauds or other violations of law in the traffic therein." 18
From this statement of the legislature, it seems quite clear that they
conceived of the law as one which would regulate the whole course of
trading from the manufacturer to the consumer. They treat it as a
chain, each party from the producer to the consumer forming a link,
each to be protected from the other. One of the most vital links in
the chain is the retailer. He is obliged to buy of the manufacturer
and wholesaler just as the consumer is obliged to buy from him. He
is obliged to rely upon the honesty of those from whom he purchases,
just as those who buy from him must rely upon his integrity.
Although there is no doubt that the general buying public was intended
to benefit by the act in question, why should the benefit be limited to
that group when the purview of the statute runs the gamut from
producer to consumer? There is nothing to suggest that the act was
intended to prevent fraud and the like upon the consumer alone, and
at the same time leave without remedy one equally connected with the
traffic in foods.
In the light of the expressed intention of the legislature to regulate the traffic in food from the manufacturer to consumer, it seems
reasonable to construe the act so that it will not only bind each one
engaged in the traffic in food, but will give him the benefit of the law
in event of a violation of the act. It is therefore suggested that the
principal case may be sustained on this ground: the retail dealer was
one of the group controlled by the act, and one of the class intended
to benefit by it; the violation of that statute by the manufacturer and
the resulting damage sustained by the retailer warrant the application
of the general rule that where a statute prohibits a thing for the benefit
of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the
recompense of a wrong done to him through violation of that law.
C. L. S.
ARE TRUSTS WHERE THE SETTLOR RESERVES No INTEREST IN
HIMSELF TAXABLE UNDER THE COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX ?-

"The possibilities for evasion of statutes imposing taxes on decedent's
estates, through the creation inter vivos of future interests in such
estates, produced

the common

statutory provision"

" N. Y. Ann. Cons. Laws (2d ed., 1917), p. 2758.
'See 35 YALE L. J. 6oi (1926).

I

taxing the

NOTES

"value of any interest of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a trust
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death." 2
The transfer tax or collateral-inheritance tax, as it is more
properly called, is admittedly not a property tax. And while there
is some difference of opinion as to what is taxed," it is generally held
to be imposed on the transfer of the right of succession in property. 4
As an aid in deciding whether or not the conveyance is without the
statute, some courts look to the property interest of which the grantor
has divested himself 5 while others stress the rights which are vested
in the grantee.'
It would seem that the purpose of these statutes is not so much
a means of collecting additional revenue but a means of preventing
an evasion of that which would otherwise be collectible upon decedent's estates under existing statutes. Thus many conveyances, although purporting to pass future interests during the lifetime of the
grantor, really were intended not to take effect until after the death
of the grantor. Because of the form in which these conveyances
were made, they were not subject to tax as property of the decedent
under existing statutes. In such conveyances the grantor, in divesting himself of his property during his lifetime, retained some beneficial interest in it. As a result the question concerning the application of the collateral inheritance tax statutes most frequently arises
when there is a retention of some interest in the grantor.
In Reish v. Commonwalth,7 where the grantor conveyed property
to the grantee, but in effect reserved the income from it for life, it
was held the statute applied. The court said that the tax will not be
defeated by a conveyance of the title nor by possession taken under
it if the enjoyment is intended to take effect at the death of the
grantor. It is generally held, in accord with the Reish case, that the
'Revenue Act of i918, § 4o2 (c), 40 Stat. 1097, U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp.
1919) § 6336 3/4c, the wording of which is similar to that of statutes in the ma-

jority of states.

'The tax is on the privilege of coming into possession of property. Lacy v.
State Treasurer, 121 N. W. 179 (Iowa, i9o9).
'Keeny v. New York, 222 U. S. 525 (i912); Emmons v. Shaw, 17i Mass.
410, 5o N. E. 1033 (898) ; In re Schmidlapp's Estate, 119 Misc. 215, i96 N. Y.

Supp. io8 (1922). See 7 MiNN. L. REv. 598 (1923).
People v. Moir, 207 Ill. i8o, 69 N. E. 9o5 (i9o4) ; In re Thorne, 44 App.
Div. 8, 6o N. Y. Supp. 419 (1899).

A conveyance must be such as parts with

title, possession and enjoyment during the grantor's lifetime. Reish v. Com.,
io6 Pa. 521 (1884).
"Coolidge v. Nichols, 4 Fed. (2d) i12, (D. C. Mass. 1925); Northeast
Trust Co. v. Abbot, 205 Mass. 279, 91 N. E. 379 (191o) ; State Street Trust Co.
v. Treasurer, 2o9 Mass. 373, 95 N. E. 851 (1911) ; In re Patterson's Estate, 146
App. Div. 286, 130 N. Y. Supp. 97o, aff'd. 204 N. Y. 677, 98 N. E. 1io9
'Supra, note 5.

(1912).
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reservation of income " or the retention of a life estate 9 in the
grantor subjects the transfer to the tax on the grantor's death, for
the reason that the possession or enjoyment in the beneficiaries of
the grant or trust, being contingent upon the death of the grantor,
takes effect at or after his death. There are a few courts, however,
which come to an opposite conclusion, 10 not upon strict legal reasoning
but because of the fact that no intention to evade the tax was found.
It should be noted that these courts do not adhere to the words of the
statute, since the enjoyment does not take effect until the grantor's
death. The retention by the grantor of a life interest in the property
is so distinctly a characteristic of possession or enjoyment of an estate
as to be convincing evidence of an intent that the grant or the deed
of trust is not to take effect -in enjoyment until the grantor's death;
the death is the contingency upon which vesting of the beneficial
interest in the transferees depends.
Some courts hold the transfer taxable if the transferor reserve
a power of revocation, on the theory that the power gave control of
the fund to the transferor as long as he lived, and therefore the
absolute enjoyment, being contingent upon the death of the transferor, did not take effect until his death. It is immaterial that he did
not exercise this power but that he could have done so." The general view, however, is that a power of revocation, of itself, is not
sufficient to make the grant take effect at the death of the grantor. It
is not in itself enough to find that the intent of the donor was not to
make an absolute transfer. Until the power to revoke is exercised,
the transfer is complete in possession or enjoyment, for the unused
power does not deprive the beneficiaries of their interests, or make
them contingent upon the donor's death. 2"
'Reed v. Howbert, 8 Fed. (2d) 641 (D. C. Colo. ig2s); In the Matter of
Green, 153 N. Y. 223, 47 N. E. 292 (I897) ; In re Cornell, 17o N. Y. 423, 63
N. E. 445 (I9O2); DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 368, I5 Atl. 641 (1889). When
part of income is reserved only that part of the fund necessary to produce that
amount of income will be taxed. People v. Kelley, 218 Ill. 5o9, 75 N. E. lO38
(19o5). Cf. In re Cruger, 454 App. Div. 405, 66 N. Y. Supp. 636, aff'd. 166 N.
Y. 6o2, 59 N. E. 1121 (I900).
'People v. Tavener, 300 Ill. 373, 133 N. E. 211 (192i) ; Re Dobson's Estate,
73 Misc. 170, 132 N. Y. Supp. 472 (1911) ; Re Todd's Estate, 237 Pa. 466, 85
Atl. 845 (1912).

"0Girard Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 3 Fed. (2) 618 (E. D. Pa. 1925) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (914).
See 74 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 176 (1925).
" Bullen v. Wisconsin, 24o U. S. 625 (1922); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.
v. Winthrop, 2o7 App. Div. 356, 202 N. Y. Supp. 456 (0923). In re Fulham's
Estate, 11g At. 433 (Vt. 1923).
People v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (i919) ; Dexter
v. Jackson, 243 Mass. 523, 137 N. E. 877 (1923) ; Matter of Totten, i7q N. Y.
112, 71 N. E. 748 (i9o4) ; In re Miller's Estate, 2o4 App. Div. 418, 198 N. Y.
Supp. 202 (923) ; Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Adt. 176 (1924). See 71
U. OF PA. L. REv. 404 (1923).

NOTES
The courts have gone further and have held the tax applicable
to a trust, which may be otherwise unconditional, when, by its terms,
the deed provides that the termination of the trust or a distribution
of the corpus is to take place at the death of the grantor. 8 The reason for these decisions is that the distribution of the corpus, being
contingent upon the death of the grantor, is in its nature a quasitestamentary disposition.
In the recent case of Bradley v. Nichols' 4 the government
attempted to apply the statute to a trust, which heretofore has been
held to be exempt from the imposition of the tax. A woman conveyed property in trust, one-half of the income to be paid to her for
life, and the other half to her daughters for their lives; upon the
death of any of the daughters her share of the income was to go to
her issue, or in default of issue to the surviving daughters, until
twenty years after the death of the last surviving daughter, when the
principal was to be distributed to the then living issue. A reversionary interest was retained by the mother only in the event that she
survive all of her daughters and all of their issue. It was held that,
the statute 1 did not apply to the half of the trust fund, of which she
retained no interest because it did not take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after her death within the meaning of the statute.
It should be noted that the trust is unconditional and terminates
at a future time regardless of, and not contingent upon, the death of
the settlor. The beneficial interests of the issue in the corpus of the
trust is subject to be divested only by their death prior -to the termination of the trust. The government does not rest its contention upon
the improbable contingency that the mother might survive all of the
beneficiaries. It contends that although the transfer is absolute and
complete before death, yet since the trust is not complete before death
to its final limitation the statute is to be applied.
In a recent Pennsylvania decision 18 the court was in accord with
the Bradley case. There the grantor conveyed property in trust for
his children and their issue. The termin:M€ )n f the trust was to
take place twenty-one years a,' er the death of the last surviving
child. The conveyance was held not subject to the tax. The court
said that when the deed of trust was executed all the property was
thereby transferred to the Trustee. The Trustee exercised for the
beneficiaries complete rights of ownership, and the death of the
grantor did not change either the character of the payment of income
or deed under which it was placed.
Upon the reasoning of the foregoing case and others which are in
Coolidge v. Nichols; Northeast Trust Co. v. Abbot; State Street Trust

Co. v. Treasurer and Receiver General; In re Patterson's Estate; all supra, note
6; In the Matter of Bostwick, 16o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (8_99).
13 Fed. (2d) 857 (D. C. Mass. 1926).
"Supra, note 2.
1
'Dolan's Estate, supra, note 12.
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accord, there is a definite determination of the beneficial interests
(under the deed of trust), the disposition of which is established during the grantor's lifetime and in no way affected by or contingent upon
his death. The possession or enjoyment of the property vested in the
beneficiaries immediately upon the execution of the deed of trust
and was not "intended to take effect at or after his death."
Admittedly the government in the Bradley case is correct when
they say that the question whether or not the possession or enjoyment
is postponed does not of itself turn upon the interest, if any, reserved
in the settlor; for, as we have seen,' 8 there are cases in which no
interest was reserved and yet were held within the statute. However,
in the cases cited by them the termination of the trust was contingent
upon the death of the settlor and are therefore no authority for the
instant case. The New York cases clearly recognize the distinction
between an unconditional trust in which the termination is not contingent and one which takes place at the settlor's death. In the
Estate of Masury 19 where the termination of the trust was to take
place at a time independent of the settlor's death, the trust was held
not taxable. In the Matter of Bostwick 20 where the corpus was to
be distributed upon the death of the settlor, the trust was held taxable.
In its dictum 2 the court approved of the Masury case upon its
facts.
If the statute is to be construed as meaning that "possession or
enjoyment" in the beneficiaries takes effect only when all of them,
including the last possible cestui que trust actually receive the benefit
of the trust (and the statute has been so construed in Shukert v.
Allen 22) the contention of the government that the trust must be
terminated before the death of the settlor, to be without the statute,
appears to be well founded.
In the Bradley case the actual benefit of either income or prinPeople v. Kelley, supra, note 8; People v. Northern Trust Co. supra, note
Dexter v. Jackson, supra, note 12; In the Matter of Masury, 28 App. Div.
580, 51 N. Y. Supp. 331, aff'd. 159 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 1127 (1899) ; In re Bower's
12;

Estate, 195 App. Div. 548, 186 N. Y. Supp. 912, aff'd. 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E.
91o (292) ; In re Cochrane's Estate, 117 Misc. Rep. 18, 19o N. Y. Supp. 895

; In re Wing's Estate, 19o N. Y. Supp. go8 (1921).
'Supra, note 13.
20Supra, note 17.
Supra, note 13.
"If a person intended in good faith to make an absolute gift during his life
to others . . . which shall not be contingent as to its possession or enjoyment
upon the event of his death, there is no inhibition in the statute in that respect."
In the Matter of Bostwick, supra, note 13, at pp. 494 and 210. In re Patterson's
Estate, supra, 'note 6, distinguished the Masury Case, supra, note 17, from the
Bostwick case, and the trust in question being terminable at death of settlor,
followed the Bostwick case. In the cases of In re Bower's Estate, and In re
Cochrane's Estate (both supra, note 17) the respective courts quoted the dictum
of the Bostwick case with approval, and held the tax could not be applied, the
trusts in question being within the limits of the Masury case.
'6 Fed. (2) 551 (C. C. A. 8th) 1925.
(1921)

NOTES

cipal of the trust will not be realized by the last possible beneficiary
until a time when most probably the settlor will have died. It is
pointed out in Szukert v. Allen, 23 that while the transfer is complete before death the trust is not; that the trust as to the last possible
cestui que trust, does not take effect in possession or enjoyment upon
the execution of the deed of trust, but only after a time when the
settlor may have died, and since the settlor has in fact died, and the
possession or enjoyment not having been as yet realized by the final
beneficiaries, the trust is one intended to take effect at or after
grantor's death-therefore, taxable under the statute.
Thus, on the one hand we have courts interpreting the statute
to mean that "possession or enjoyment" takes effect upon the execution of the deed of trust, unless there is a retention of some beneficial
interest during settlor's lifetime or unless the passing of the corpus
is to take place at his death. In short "possession or enjoyment" in
all of the beneficiaries takes effect upon the accrual of their vested
interest; provided the actual receipt of the benefits is in no way contingent upon the settlor's death. On the other hand, however, in the'
Shiukert case the statute is held to refer to the time when the last possible cestui que trust actually receives the benefits of the trust; and
if this takes place after the death of the settlor, the trust is taxable.
The aim of the statute is to reach property, where by reasonable
deduction the donor intended to retain its enjoyment, 2 or it may be
said that the purpose of the statute is to tax a transfer or a trust having its occasion on the death of the grantor.2 5 -In the Bradley case
the settlor divested herself of all her property interests and at her
death there was nothing for her, the law, or anyone to do to complete
the act of vesting the property.2" Her death did not increase, diminish, or alter the rights of the beneficiaries; their estate was fixed and
definite and in no way affected by the death of the settlor. It is submitted that the better view is opposed to the government's contention
in the Bradley case and the authority which supports it.2" It would
appear that the framers of the statute intended to tax only a right
of succession in property contingent upon the death of the grantor,
because of the retention of some interest by him in the deed of trust,
or a provision in it terminating the trust at or after his death. If a
deed is unconditional and the termination of the beneficial interests
" Supra, note 22.
2'In re Cochrane's Estate, supra, note 17.
127 A. S. R. IO83 (98), note.
Dolan's Estate, supra, note 12.
' Certiorari has been granted in Shukert v. Allen, by the United States Supreme Court, 46 Sup. Ct. 24 (1925), and it therefore lacks finality The Shukert
case may be distinguished from the Bradley case upon its facts. In that case
the settlor had reached the age of fifty-seven years. The income and principal
of the trust were to be allowed to accumulate for thirty years when distribution
was to be made. It may be the court felt that the settlor was using the trust
as a device to escape the tax and so held the trust within the statute.
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under it is independent of the death of the grantor, the fact that those
interests may not benefit the last possible cestui que trust until after a
time when the grantor may have died will not prevent the grant from
taking effect upon its execution; and, if the enjoyment of the beneficial interests is so postponed, the death of the grantor was not a
condition to its vesting, since the death must inevitably occur, nor
was the trust (assuming it was not made "in contemplation of
death") testamentary in character. 28 "An unconditional grant . . .
which . . . only awaits consummation in due course without refer-

ence to the death or possible death of the grantor, is not within the
purview of the statute."-29
Jesse H.
"'Supra, note 17; also Dinslage v. Stratman. x8o N. W. 8i (Neb. i9-o).
Simpson, J., in Spangler's Estate, 281 Pa. 118, 124, 126 At. 252, 254
(1924).

